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CORPORATIONS AND THE 99%: TEAM
PRODUCTION REVISITED
Shlomit Azgad-Tromer*
This Article explores the legal manifestation of the interaction
between the general public and the public corporation. Revisiting
team production analysis, this Article redefines the corporate team
and argues that while several constituencies indeed form part of the
corporate team, others are exogenous to the corporate enterprise.
Employees, suppliers and financiers contribute together to the
common corporate enterprise, enjoying a long-term relational
contract with the corporation, while retail consumers contract with
the corporation at arm’s length, and other people living alongside the
corporation do not contract with it at all. Under this organizational
model, the general public may participate in the team forming the
corporate enterprise by providing public financing. Indeed, corporate
law was developed to protect public investors.
However, evidence shows that most of the listed equity is no longer
held by the general public directly; the new shareholders are
institutional investors. This Article analyzes the impact of
institutionalization on the interaction of corporations with the
general public, outlining spheres of potential divergence between
institutional and retail investors and raising the timely concern for
the agency costs embedded in the relationship between the general
public and institutional investors. First, not all institutional investors
are investing on behalf of the public. Shareholder empowerment
platforms are frequently mobilized by intermediaries representing
only the wealthiest 1%. Second, when shareholders are mostly
institutional investors, the likelihood of distributional conflicts
between various stakeholder groups is higher because the
institutional thought and decision-making patterns do not match
those of the general public. The objectives of institutional investors
are significantly narrower than, and potentially divergent from, those
of the general public. Third, the technology used for trading by
institutional investors, algorithmic trading, potentially imposes
externalities on retail investors, and ultimately widens the gap
between corporations and the general public. It may often be the case
that the institutional interests align with those of the general public,
but the law does not necessitate it.
* University of California, Berkeley. This paper has benefited from the insightful
comments of Amiram Gill, Sharon Hannes, and Chief Justice Leo E. Strine, Jr.
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This Article further discusses converse trends towards convergence,
including socially responsible investments and impact investments,
corporate social responsibility, sustainability reporting, and customer
voice. This Article ultimately suggests policy implications. When
shareholders’ interests are not necessarily aligned with those of the
general public, we have reason to revisit the axiom of shareholder
value as the underlying purpose of corporations, the boundaries of
fiduciary duty, and the limited platform and audience for
sustainability reporting.
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INTRODUCTION
“We are the 99%” is the political slogan of the Occupy Wall Street
movement.1 The slogan refers to the wealth and income inequality

1. Erik Kain, Outside of Wonkland, ‘We are the 99%’ Is a Pretty Good Slogan,
FORBES (Oct. 12, 2011, 12:11 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2011/10/12/o
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prevalent in American society. Equally as important, the slogan
symbolizes a divergence of corporate America from the public.
Corporations are arguably the most significant legal institution in
today’s society; they accommodate most of society’s commercial needs,
provide employment opportunities, and have an immeasurable impact
on public policy. Considering the dominance and power held by
corporations, their potential divergence from the general public is not to
be taken lightly. Nevertheless, the stakeholder theory of corporate law
portrays the corporation as a sphere of cooperation and coordination
between all stakeholder constituencies including the general public.2
This Article explores the relationship of the general public with the
public corporation and its legal manifestation in corporate law.
This Article is organized as follows. Using the contractual model of
the corporation, Part I introduces the stakeholder theory and team
production analysis.3 This section argues that the corporation does not
provide equal participation or representation to all stakeholder
constituencies.4 Rather, the corporation’s financiers, suppliers, and
employees form the corporate team and create the corporate value. In
contrast, the corporation’s contractual relationship with the general
public is at arm’s length, and for corporations with no retail consumers,
there are often no contractual foundations at all.5 Under this
organizational model, the general public assumes a role within the
corporate team only to the extent that it provides public financing.6
While in the past, the general public provided financing to public
corporations and held securities in person, retail investors have now
disappeared from direct ownership of listed corporations.7 Part II
analyzes the impact of institutionalization, outlining the differences
between retail and institutional investors with regard to shareholder
activism, investment objectives, and trading mechanisms.8 First,
utside-of-wonkland-we-are-the-99-is-a-pretty-good-slogan/
[http://perma.cc/4FZWJ9SG].
2. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Stakeholders: A
Contractual Perspective, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 401, 416-19 (1993).
3. See infra Part I.
4. See infra Part I.
5. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 250, 256 (1999).
6. See infra Part I.
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part II.
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shareholder activism is often mobilized by hedge funds, representing the
wealthiest 1%, with little participation by retail investors.9 Second, the
investment objectives of institutional investors are significantly
narrower than, and potentially divergent from, those of the general
public, as not all institutional investors are investing on the public’s
behalf.10 Banks and insurance companies, for example, contract with the
general public under loan and insurance contracts. Their duties toward
the general public are confined to their obligations to their consumer
constituency, while they invest for the benefit of their own accounts.
Therefore, institutionalization may significantly disadvantage retail
investors, as much of the impact and voice given by the empowerment
platforms are utilized by institutional investors and intermediaries who
are not legally bound by the general public’s interests.11 Third, the
institutional trading methodologies of algorithmic trading (“algotrading”) are technologically inaccessible to individuals, potentially
imposing negative externalities on retail investors.12 Overall,
institutionalization has demonstrated that shareholder empowerment
does not empower all shareholders equally.
Despite the divergence of corporations from the general public, Part
III describes increasing trends towards convergence.13 This section
surveys patterns of convergence between corporations and the general
public, including investment paradigms that consider social progress in
portfolio management, the corporate social responsibility movement and
its corresponding effect on sustainability reporting, and the public
corporation’s growing interest in the voice of the general public through
social media and websites providing accumulated customer reviews
such as Yelp.com.14
Finally, the article concludes with policy implications and a
proposal to reunite the 99% with the 1%.15 Understanding that the
primary purpose of public policy should be to enhance aggregate social
welfare, corporate law must face the challenge of aligning the interests

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
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of today’s institutional shareholders with those of the general public.16
Because the general public no longer directly owns stock, the mandatory
disclosure of nonfinancial performance and sustainability reporting
should not be restricted to public corporations.17 Rather, these disclosure
requirements should apply to corporations funded privately that serve
public roles or provide public services.
I. STAKEHOLDER THEORY AND TEAM PRODUCTION ANALYSIS
Corporations are often theorized as bundles of contracts between
various agents facilitating cooperation and coordination between
participants in the corporate enterprise.18 The corporation is portrayed as
a nexus of contracts, an organizational means of reducing contracting
costs and inducing trust between the various contracting parties and
corporate constituencies.19 Because corporate law is restricted to the
corporate constituencies, the public participates in the legal institution of
the corporation only insofar as it encompasses one of the constituencies
such as the consumer.
Under the stakeholder approach to corporate law, the corporation is
an organizational platform for a set of relationships between groups that
have a stake in a common enterprise. The purpose of the corporation is
to create as much value as possible for all stakeholders, usually defined
as groups without whose support the organization would cease to exist,
including shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, lenders, and
society as a whole.20 Alternatively, a corporation’s stakeholders can be
defined as those whose stake in the corporate enterprise contributes to
16.
17.
18.

See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.C.
See HENRY HANSMANN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, What is Corporate Law¸ in THE
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH LAW 1, 6 (2d
ed. 2009); Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
19. See HANSMANN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 18; see also William W. Bratton,
The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual Corporation, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 180,
191 (1992).
20. See R. F. Stewart, J. K. Allen & J. M. Cavender, Stanford Research Institute,
Long Range Planning Serv., Indus. Econ. Div., The Strategic Plan, Research Report
168 (1963); R. EDWARD FREEMAN, JEFFREY S. HARRISON, ANDREW C. WICKS, BIDHAN
L. PARMAR & SIMONE DE COLLE, STAKEHOLDER THEORY: THE STATE OF THE ART
(2010); see also Giles Slinger, Essays on Stakeholding, (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Cambridge) (arguing that “stakeholders” refers to all those who have a
“stake” in the corporate enterprise and contribute to the success of the corporation).
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the success of its business. 21 Stakeholder theory thus assesses the
corporation as a platform for business endeavors designed to enable
cooperation between various contributors and enhance its value for a
wider community that includes not only the shareholders but also the
customers, suppliers, employees, financiers (including shareholders,
bondholders and banks), communities, and managers. The role of
management is to shape and manage these relationships and perform the
distributional allocation of resources and corporate activities among the
various stakeholder constituencies.22 The following diagram
demonstrates the juggling of corporate management among different
stakeholder constituencies.

23

Illustration 1: Corporate Stakeholders

21.
22.

See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
See R. EDWARD FREEMAN, JEFFREY S. HARRISON & ANDREW C. WICKS,
MANAGING FOR STAKEHOLDERS: SURVIVAL, REPUTATION AND SUCCESS 7 (2007).
23. See id.
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Perhaps because of the wide array of agents taking part in the
creation of value and its distribution through the corporate platform,
some scholars find the justification of stakeholder accountability to be
within the firm’s commitment to business ethics and social
responsibility. Wesley Cragg, for example, argues that the corporation’s
status as a social institution imposes private and public liability,
accounting for stakeholder interests while pursuing shareholder profits.24
In recognizing the diversity of stakeholders, the stakeholder theory
advocates a holistic approach to management, integrating considerations
that are considered ancillary by the conventional analysis of agency
theory and shareholder primacy including social, political, ethical, and
environmental considerations.25 Some scholars argue that the wider
circle of stakeholders should also extend to wider stakeholder
representation in management.26 Corporate management continuously
engages in the distributional allocation of resources, and stakeholder
theory provides a doctrinal foundation for greater social accountability.
However, the notion of the ethical corporation under agency theory
seems to be paradoxical; at some point there is a conflict between two
choices: ethics without business or business without ethics.27
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout portray the corporation as a “nexus
of firm-specific investments,” an organizational platform for team
production, where several parties may pursue a joint enterprise within
which each party contributes “unique and essential resources to the
corporate enterprise . . . .”28 Under their team production model of the
firm, it is the “horizontal interaction” that enables team members to
collaborate and produce corporate value beyond the “sum of their

24. See Wesley Cragg, Business Ethics and Stakeholder Theory, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q.
113 (2002).
25. See, e.g., R. Edward Freeman & S. Ramakrishna Velamuri, A New Approach to
CSR: Company Stakeholder Responsibility, in CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY:
RECONCILING ASPIRATION WITH APPLICATION 9 (Andrew Kakabadse & Mette Morsing
eds., 2006).
26. See, e.g., Charles W. L. Hill & Thomas M. Jones, Stakeholder-Agency Theory,
29 J. MGMT. STUD. 131, 134 (1992).
27. J. R. Boatright, Fiduciary Duties and the Shareholder-Management Relation:
Or, What’s so Special About Shareholders?, 4 BUS. ETHICS Q. 393 (1994); Kenneth E.
Goodpaster, Business Ethics and Stakeholder Analysis, 1 BUS. ETHICS Q. 53, 53 (1991);
Kenneth Goodpaster & T. Holloran, In Defense of a Paradox, 4 BUS. ETHICS Q. 423
(1994).
28. Blair & Stout, supra note 5, at 275.
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individual inputs.”29 Rather than “a bundle of assets under common
ownership,” Blair and Stout suggest that the corporation is a mediating
hierarchy of horizontal cooperation.30 As they describe it, “[p]erhaps one
individual brings critical technical skills to the table, while another has a
talent for management, and a third provides marketing insights.”31
A team is a group of people with complementary skills who are
committed to a common purpose, each with a distinct role in sharing
culture, tasks and leadership.32 Indeed, some stakeholder constituencies
conform to this model: shareholders often need employees and suppliers
to engage in production while shareholders, employees, and suppliers all
need the financiers to lend the enterprise a credit line. But stakeholder
theory and team production analysis fail to reflect the distinct nature of
the various relationships the corporation encompasses. In every
corporation, several stakeholder constituencies are negotiating and
cooperating towards a common goal, forming the insider corporate
“team,” while other stakeholder constituencies are negotiating with the
corporation at arm’s length, excluded from the core of the corporate
platform.33 The horizontal cooperation enterprise is exclusively reserved
for those parties contributing directly to the common corporate
endeavor: those who are part of the team.
In particular, the general public is not part of the team engaging in
the corporate enterprise. The general public rarely has a seat at the
corporate table. The public is absent from the corporate premises and
lacks institutional representation in the corporation’s organizational
form.34 With such a low percentage of retail investors, and a negligible

29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 270.
Id. at 271-76.
Id. at 275.
JON R. KATZENBACH & DOUGLAS K. SMITH, THE WISDOM OF TEAMS:
CREATING THE HIGH-PERFORMANCE ORGANIZATION (1993).
33. For an analysis of the effect of different social relationships on commercial
contracts, see Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94
NW. U. L. REV. 877 (2000); Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-term
Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law, 72
NW. U. L. REV. 854 (1977-1978); IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN
INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1981).
34. For a dramatic portrait of the seclusion of corporations from the general public,
see JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGIC PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND POWER
(2003). For a doctrinal analysis of the limited scope of corporate law, see Shlomit
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percentage of retail investors actively trading, the public remains living
alongside the corporation, occasionally wearing the consumer hat but
mostly serving as a human background for the social and environmental
externalities of the corporate enterprise. Stakeholder theory and team
production analysis broaden the group of constituencies to which the
corporation’s management is accountable, but they sustain the alienation
of the general public from the corporate scene. The following is a
diagram demonstrating the juggling of corporate management among
different stakeholder constituencies, taking into account the nature of the
contractual relationship between the corporation and the different
stakeholder constituencies.

35

Illustration 2: Internal and External Stakeholders

II. INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
Once upon a time, most investors in the capital markets were
individuals, but this is no longer the case.36 Investments in public

Azgad-Tromer, The Case of Consumer-Oriented Corporate Governance,
Accountability, and Disclosure, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 227, 228-48, 285-90 (2015).
35. This illustration is an original design in order to provide a visual representation
of the interaction between internal and external stakeholders.
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corporations are now dominated by financial corporations, also labeled
as “institutional investors.”37 In 1945, individual households directly
owned 93% of outstanding corporate equities; by 2014, individuals held
only 36%.38 Additionally, investments by individuals tend to be more
passive: from April 2005 to August 2006, trades by individuals
represented, on average, less than 3% of the NYSE trading volume for
NYSE listed firms.39 Instead, institutional activism drives both trading
volume and proxy voting.40 The public corporation is no longer public.
Retail investments were the fuel for dispersed ownership, affecting
the design of United States corporate governance. It was not until the
latter part of the nineteenth century that most businesses were
incorporated; in fact corporations played a negligible role in the
nonfinancial sector of the American economy before that time.41 In
1859, the nonfinancial corporations’ share of national wealth is
estimated to have been only about 7%.42 Initially, the economy was
dominated by self-funded, small, family businesses. People trusted their
own endeavors. For example, the farmer invested in her farm and the
shoemaker invested in his street stand. Incorporation gained popularity
in the 1840s and 1850s when funding for the railroads required public
financing through security issuances. Later, from 1880 until World War
36. Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization
of the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1026 (2009).
37. Id.
38. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FEDERAL RESERVE
STATISTICAL RELEASE: Z.1 FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: HISTORICAL
ANNUAL TABLES 1945-1954, at 121 tbl. L.223 Corporate Equities (1) (2015),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/annuals/a1945-1954.pdf
[http://perma.cc/6DN8-PHY9] [hereinafter FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE,
1945-1954]; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FEDERAL RESERVE
STATISTICAL RELEASE: Z.1 FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: FIRST
QUARTER 2015, at 119 tbl. L.213 Corporate Equities (1) (2015), http://www.federalrese
rve.gov/releases/z1/20150611/z1.pdf [http://perma.cc/YK8V-GK6H] (the data cited
refers to the fourth quarter).
39. See Alicia J. Davis, Do Individual Investors Affect Share Price Accuracy?
Some Preliminary Evidence 36-38 (Univ. of Mich. L. Sch. Empirical Legal Studies
Ctr., Working Paper No. 07-018, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=998093 [http://perma.cc/RN9C-3XDK].
40. See generally id.
41. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE STOCK – A BACKGROUND STUDY
35 (Raymond W. Goldsmith ed., 1973).
42. Id.
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I, incorporating again resurfaced, as the rapidly expanding
manufacturing, mining, electric power, and communication sectors
sought public funding through the corporate issue of stock, bonds and
other debt.43
Individual investors funded the rise of corporations in America.44
However, since individual investors have been leaving the securities
markets, institutional investors have become the dominant owners of
securities in America. Below is an illustrative graph of the share of
households and institutions, respectively, in total equities outstanding, in
the period between 1964 and 2012.

45

Illustration 3: U.S. Households Percent Share of Total Holdings of Equities

Institutional investors are financial corporations; some of whom
invest on behalf of their clients directly and some of whom do not.
Pension funds and mutual funds, for example, invest on behalf of their
clients. Consumers trust these financial institutions to manage their
savings, and these institutions are obliged to act as fiduciaries for their
clients and beneficiaries.46 Saving on the institutional platform is
encouraged by tax incentives, through which governments enhance the
43.
44.

Davis, supra note 39, at 39-40.
Federal Reserve data from the 1940’s show that more than 90% of outstanding
equity was held by individual household investors. See FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL
RELEASE, 1945-1954, supra note 38.
45. SIFMA, 2015 SIFMA FACT BOOK 61 tbl. U.S. Holdings of Equities.
46. See generally, Hanoch Dagan & Sharon Hannes, Managing Our Money: The
Law of Financial Fiduciaries as a Private Law Institution, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., Oxford
Univ. Press 2014).
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institutionalization of capital markets and empower institutional
investors.47
Other institutional investors, such as commercial banks and
insurance companies, invest sums they collect from their consumers,
either as a loan or as a premium.48 These institutional investors do not
invest on behalf of their clients, instead the return or loss from their
investments is credited to their own account. Eventually, the
beneficiaries are the shareholders of the institution. Typically,
institutional investors are more heavily regulated than other
corporations, with financial regulators often imposing specific leverage
and minimum capital requirements, due to the vulnerability of financial
markets and the need to secure financial stability.49 An exception to the
highly regulated regime of financial institutions is hedge funds, which
often adopt speculative and high-risk strategies, and frequently engage
in active investments, sometimes effecting major changes in the
strategy, management, or structure of public firms.50
The difference between retail investors and institutional investors
makes a significant impact on the nature of our capital markets. The
remainder of this section surveys the impact of institutionalization on
shareholder activism, investment objectives, and trading methodologies.

47. Such tax incentives are common in most western societies. JOHN C. BOGLE,
THE CLASH OF THE CULTURES: INVESTMENT VS. SPECULATION 29-31 (2012); see also
Immacolata Marino, Filippo Maria Pericoli & Luigi Ventura, Tax Incentives and
Household Investment in Complementary Pension Insurance: Some Recent Evidence
from the Italian Experience 14 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 247, 247-63 (2011).
48. The formal definition for a bank is a firm taking deposits and making loans –
on a contractual basis. The relationship of the depositor with the bank is based on a
consumer contract. Likewise, consumers of insurance policies are purchasing the
insurer’s contingent liability upon the insurance event. Insurance companies and banks
thus invest their own funds collected from their consumer. On the other hand, mutual
funds are pooled investment vehicles, investing on their clients’ behalf. See, e.g.,
Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a Multisectored Financial Services Industry: An
Exploratory Essay, 77 WASH. U. L. REV., 319, 327-331 (1999).
49. HOWELL E. JACKSON & EDWARD L. SYMONS, JR., THE REGULATION OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1999); Anat R. Admati, The Compelling Case for Stronger
and More Effective Leverage Regulation in Banking, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 35, 41 (2014).
50. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance
and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021 (2007).
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A. SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM
Individuals are dispersed investors with little incentive to act
individually on the corporate scene due to both the size of their expected
returns and collective action problems. Because individuals have small
and diversified portfolios, they are typically “rationally apathetic”
towards their securities holdings.51 Institutional investors, however, have
larger stakes and are thus more likely to engage actively in the corporate
scene. Indeed, institutionalization is famed for “shareholder activism,”
which has disciplinary effects on the companies that institutional
investors hold, and often leads to changes in governance.52
Institutional investors have a strong impact on the corporations they
hold. These investors create this impact either by simply selling their
large number of shares and voting with their feet, or by voting against
corporate decisions, which can lead to amendments in governance or to
hostile takeovers.53 Institutional investors also form coalitions and
industry organizations, such as the Council of Institutional Investors,
providing a platform for cooperation in legal, governance, and strategy
issues.54 The Financial Times declared 2013 the year of “the triumph of
activism,” and Barron’s called it the year that “activist investing had
entered a golden age.”55
To be sure, not all institutional investors are active. Many
institutional investors are “sleeping giants,” and are notably passive due
to a variety of barriers, including free-riding, conflicts of interest, and a

51. LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS
FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 89 (2012).
52. See Anat R. Admati, Paul Pfleiderer & Josef Zechner, Large Shareholder
Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium, 102 J. POL. ECON. 1097,
1097-1130 (1994).
53. See Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, The “Wall Street Walk” and
Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2245, 2246-49
(2009).
54. See, e.g., About Us: Corporate Governance Advisory Council, Council of
Institutional
Investors,
CII
(2013),
http://www.cii.org/cgadvisorycouncil
[http://perma.cc/2R7F-AHRB].
55. Brian R. Cheffins, The Team Production Model as a Paradigm 37 (Eur. Corp.
Governance Institute, Working Paper No. 262/2014, 2014) (citing Stephan Foley, The
Brave New World of Investor Activism, FIN. TIMES (U.S.) Dec. 24, 2013, at 15 and Avi
Salzman, How to Profit From Today’s Shareholder Activism, BARRON’S, Nov. 30 2013,
at 25).
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common fee structure.56 In practice, third-party intermediaries play a
major role in mobilizing activism and defining its agenda.57 Activists
function as arbitrageurs, creating value by amplifying the institutional
investor voice.58 However, not all activists are bound by duties to the
general public or have their interests aligned with it. Of the various
activist agents, hedge funds are particularly prominent: between 2009
and 2014 they launched campaigns at more than one-fifth of companies
in the S&P 500.59 According to FactSet research, 60% of proxy fights
prompted by a hedge fund activist that went to an actual vote in 2013
resulted in at least a partial activist victory.60 The peril of hedge fund
activism has prompted a change in the governance of public
corporations even before they have been targeted.61 Managers of public
companies start to “look at (their) company through the lens of an
activist.”62 Public companies are now offering board representation to
activists who have not even launched proxy contests for board seats.63
Proxy contests and shareholder activism led by hedge funds have
fostered a “really enhanced investor outreach” in public companies.64
However, hedge funds are not investing on behalf of the general public.
Usually, investment in hedge funds is exclusively restricted to investors
with a net worth of $1 million or more.65

56. See Sharon Hannes, Super Hedge Fund 2-9 (Aug. 22, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2485129 [http://perma.cc/UN9J-8L23].
57. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM.
L. REV. 863, 863 (2013).
58. See id. at 901.
59. See The Barbarians Return to the Gate, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2014, at 10.
60. See Cheffins, supra note 55, at 37 (citing FactSet Insight, Activists Increasing
Success Gaining Board Seats at U.S. Companies, FACTSET (Mar. 11. 2014),
http://www.factset.com/insight/2014/3/sharkspotlight_3.11.14#.VharzvlVhBd
[http://perma.cc/N3B8-5Y8W]).
61. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118
HARV. L. REV. 833, 910 (2005).
62. Cheffins, supra note 55, at 38 (citing Dan McCrum & David Gelles, Finance:
Stirrers and Shakers, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2012, at 7).
63. Cheffins, supra note 55, at 38.
64. Id. (citing David Gelles, Boardrooms Rethink Tactics to Defang Activist
Investors, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK, Nov. 12, 2013, at F10).
65. See Getting Started: How to Buy Hedge Funds, MARKETWATCH, http://www.m
arketwatch.com/getting-started/hedge-funds [http://perma.cc/44BA-Y2VF].
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Under agency theory, it is beneficial to empower the principals
thereby reducing the agency costs of discretion by the appointed
management. Thus, empowering shareholders with more discretion is
strongly advocated by scholars working within the agency theory
paradigm.66 However, shareholder empowerment does not empower all
shareholders equally. As previously mentioned, retail investors hardly
trade and are mostly apathetic towards actively using disciplinary
corporate governance through proxies.67 Those institutional investors
that are investing on behalf of the general public are more inclined to
make centralized voting decisions based on how all of their funds will
vote, generally exercising less activism.68 As Chief Justice of the
Delaware Supreme Court Leo E. Strine Jr. writes, “[T]he segment of the
investment community that is best positioned to vote with an eye toward
sustainable value creation is the least active in exercising voice and
judgment in American corporate governance . . . .”69 Additionally,
conflicts of interest may arise between retail investors and hedge funds,
which are prominent agents of shareholder activism, because “hedge
funds frequently engage in hedges and other sophisticated trading and
arbitrage strategies.”70 The alignment of interests between those active
shareholders and the general public remains to be questioned.71
Activism may often enhance aggregate social welfare even in the
absence of fiduciary duties imposed on the activist agent vis-à-vis the
66.
67.

See Bebchuk, supra note 61, at 910.
See Davis, supra note 39, at 36-38. It has been reported that only a small
portion of retail investors vote. See Briefing Paper: Roundtable on Proxy Voting
Mechanics, SEC (May 23, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxyprocess/proxy
votingbrief.htm [http://perma.cc/9KE2-875F].
68. See Leo E. Strine Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic
Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L.
REV. 449, 478 (2015) (“Index fund investors do not benefit by bubbles that burst. Index
fund investors also have a more durable interest in the prospects of the corporations in
the index than investors in actively traded funds.”).
69. Id. at 477-78.
70. Kahan & Rock, supra note 50, at 1071.
71. See Martin Lipton, Further Recognition of The Adverse Effects of Activist
Hedge Funds, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (Apr. 11, 2015)
(citing Yvan Allaire, Institute for Governance of Private and Public Organizations,
Hedge Fund Activism: Preliminary Results and Some New Empirical Evidence (2015),
http://www.wlrk.com/docs/Allaire_HedgeFundActivism-new-empirical-evidenceEnglish-final.pdf [http://perma.cc/9WN5-8592]), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/0
4/11/further-recognition-of-the-adverse-effects-of-activist-hedge-funds/
[http://perma.cc/H84Y-MN56].
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general public. For example, empirical research suggests that in the five
years following activist interventions by hedge funds, target companies
demonstrated improved operating performance, contradicting claims of
a detrimental effect on the long-term interests of corporations and their
shareholders due to divergent investment objectives and horizons.72
Moreover, some asset managers are actively involved in corporations
held on their clients’ behalf. Recently, for example, BlackRock Inc. and
the Vanguard Group, respectively the largest and third largest United
States asset managers, with more than $7 trillion in combined assets
under management, have made public statements emphasizing that they
are focused on corporate governance and board engagement.73
Additionally, much of the voice generated on behalf of the general
public is mobilized by active intermediaries such as Harvard’s
Shareholders Rights Project. From 2012 to 2013, the group was
responsible for over 50% of all successful precatory proposals by public
pension funds and over 20% of all successful precatory proposals.74
Therefore, while it may often be the case that an activist’s interests align
with those of the general public, the law does not necessitate this
outcome.
B. INVESTMENT OBJECTIVES
A second point of divergence between retail and institutional
investors is their investment objectives. Institutional investors are bound
to enhance financial value; indeed, that is the legal purpose of their
institutionalization.75 Some institutional investors do act on their clients’
behalf, such as a mutual fund or a pension fund. But these institutional
investors are similarly gauged by their consumers on the basis of their

72. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term
Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (2015).
73. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, THE EVOLVING LANDSCAPE OF SHAREHOLDER
ACTIVISM:
KEY
DEVELOPMENTS
AND
POTENTIAL
ACTIONS
(2015),
http://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_The_Evolving_Landsc
ape_of_Shareholder_Activism.pdf [http://perma.cc/FYZ4-L4YT].
74. Shareholder Rights Project News Alert, SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROJECT (Oct.
29, 2013), http://srp.law.harvard.edu/newsletters
/10-29-2013_SRP_newsletter.shtml [http://perma.cc/X2ZY-FUJB].
75. See David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J.
181 (2013).
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ability to make investments that yield better economic returns. Several
institutional investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies,
have grown such enormous and highly diversified portfolios that their
interests in long-term macroeconomic prosperity are significant, as their
returns are likely to reflect the financial performance of the market and
the global economy as a whole.76 These large and long-term institutional
investors are sometimes titled “universal owners.”77 As of 2014, $17
trillion was being managed by open-end mutual funds, closed-end funds,
exchange-traded funds and unit investment trusts, on behalf of 98
million United States investors.78 However, only a minority of these
institutional investors are socially responsible funds that cater to
investors who have social objectives other than profit-making, such as
fair labor practices, environmental sustainability, and the promotion of
moral values.79 The majority of institutional investors continue to ignore
environmental, social, and governance criteria in their investment
allocations.80
Unlike corporations, individuals always have additional stakeholder
capacities on the corporate scene. For example, a retail investor may be
living in the neighborhood of the corporation’s factory and suffering
pollution. Retail investors may also be the corporation’s customers.
76. See, e.g., SEARCHING FOR A UNIVERSAL ETHIC (John Berkman & William C.
Mattison III eds., 2014); see also UNEP FINANCE INITIATIVE, UNIVERSAL OWNERSHIP:
WHY ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES MATTER TO INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (2011),
http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/universal_ownership_full.pdf
[http://perma.cc/NU5U-Y857].
77. See, e.g., STOUT, supra note 51, at 86-94; Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital
Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior, 104 Q.J. ECON.
655 (1989). While Stout simultaneously accuses hedge funds of “short-termism” due to
their rather short holding periods, a recent empirical study finds no evidence that the
initial positive stock price spike accompanying activist interventions fails to appreciate
their long-term costs and therefore tends to be followed by negative abnormal returns in
the long term. To the contrary, the data found is consistent with the initial spike,
reflecting correctly the intervention’s long-term consequences. See Bebchuk, supra note
61.
78. See INV. CO. INST., 2015 INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE FACT BOOK,
http://www.icifactbook.org/fb_ch1.html [http://perma.cc/23HU-BC6K].
79. See Christopher C. Geczy, Robert F. Stambaugh & David Levin, Investing in
Socially Responsible Mutual Funds (Oct. 2005) (unpublished manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=416380
[http://perma.cc/HXT6ZY8K].
80. See Joakim Sandberg, Socially Responsible Investment and Fiduciary Duty:
Putting the Freshfields Report into Perspective, 101 J. BUS. ETHICS 143, 144 (2011).
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Individuals, as Stout says, “are not just investors. They are also
consumers who buy products, citizens who pay taxes, and organisms
who breathe air and drink water . . . .”81 Additionally, “real human
beings care about much more than just whether . . . stock rises. They
also want to protect the value of their other investments, keep their jobs,
lower their tax bills, and preserve their health.”82
The discrepancy between individual and institutional shareholders
is somewhat offset by the individual representation of institutional
investors on boards of directors. The board is comprised of individual
members, appointed by institutional shareholders. As Stout shows, these
individual members of the board are committed to the corporation’s
purpose even in the absence of substantial incentives.83 Few scholars
consider the breadth of director discretion under the business judgment
rule that is wide enough to encompass any lawful business consideration
in addition to shareholder wealth, including decisions made in favor of
the consumers, the employees, the environment, and the society as a
whole84 However, these appointed human members of the board are
agents with a mission to represent their principal, a profit-seeking
institutional investor. Only shareholders elect directors and may sue to
enforce directors’ fiduciary duties.85 As Chief Justice Leo Strine Jr.,
writes, “[w]hen only one constituency has the power to displace the
board, it is likely that the interests of that constituency will be given
primacy.”86 Their motivation and decision making process is likely to
conform to the principal’s expectations.87 When the principal’s voice is
mobilized by an activist intermediary, that intermediary’s interests are
likely to serve as a lighthouse for the corporation, whether these
interests are aligned with those of the general public or not.

81.
82.
83.

STOUT, supra note 51, at 87.
Id.
See Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (or, Why
You Don’t Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L.
1, 3 (2003).
84. See STOUT, supra note 51, at 33-45, 74-85; Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing
Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 738 (2005).
85. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211(b), 327.
86. See Strine, supra note 68, at 455.
87. See Joseph Fuller & Michael C. Jensen, Just Say No to Wall Street: Putting a
Stop to the Earnings Game, 14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 41 (2002).
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Because the objectives of corporations are narrower than those of
individuals, prudent corporate governance should regulate the
relationship between institutional investors and their beneficiaries more
closely to ensure accountability for the public’s interests. The Group of
Twenty (“G20”) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (“OECD”) recognized the risk of divergent interests
between institutional investors and the public, and in 2013, they issued
principles encouraging policies that give pension funds incentives to
align their investment strategies with their beneficiaries’ specific
interests. The G20 and OECD specifically noted the beneficiaries’
strong interest in the long-term growth of not only the pension fund
portfolio but also the wealth of the nation in which they live, taking into
account the wider individual interests of retirees.88 Still, however, the
question regarding the extent to which board members conform to
shareholders’ expectations lies at the heart of corporate law scholarship,
and corresponds to the power struggle between boards and shareholders
over control of the corporation.89
C. INVESTMENT ALLOCATION AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
Institutional investors are more likely than individuals to pursue
their investment purpose in a comprehensive and deliberate manner.90
Institutional investors are also more likely than individuals to act as
rational agents, and to collect and analyze the full information provided

88. See OECD, G20/OECD HIGH-LEVEL PRINCIPLES OF LONG-TERM INVESTMENT
FINANCING BY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 5, 9-10 (2013), http://www.oecd.org/finance
/private-pensions/G20-OECD-Principles-LTI-Financing.pdf
[http://perma.cc/V4PHZABV] (stating that long term investments should take into account the “socioeconomic and environmental impact assessments” and that “[a]n appropriate financial
inclusion and consumer protection framework combined with financial regulation
should promote long-term investment by institutional investors serving the retail market
and to protect stakeholders, policyholders and beneficiaries of institutional investors in
relation to such long term investment.”).
89. See Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism – In the Boardroom and in the
Courtroom, 68 BUS. LAW. 977, 981-82 (2013); Bebchuk, supra note 61, at 833-914; see
also STOUT, supra note 51.
90. The corporate decision making purpose is naturally less inclined to emotional
and cognitive flaws. For an analysis of board decision making process, see Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND.
L. REV. 1 (2002).
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in order to support the investment allocation decision.91 Institutional
investors are indeed a legal construct of the textbook homo economicus
model: unlike individuals, they serve as an organizational platform for
carrying out the economic vision of rational actors to its full potential.92
While corporate law and securities regulation continue to protect
the bounded rationality of retail investors, institutional investors
professionally collect all of the required information for a thorough
analysis and investment allocation even in the absence of mandatory
disclosure platforms. As Professor Donald Langevoort explains:
[T]hroughout the SEC’s history and culture, the rhetorical stress has
been on the plight of average investors, ones who lack investing
experience and sophistication so as to need the protection of the
securities laws . . . The subsequent history of rules, interpretations
and enforcement by the SEC is filled with references to both the
need to promote retail-level investor confidence . . . and the desire to
93
level the playing field between the meek and the privileged.

Langevoort conducts a thought experiment asking whether, in the
absence of retail investors, securities markets could emerge and be
governed by antifraud policy only, as opposed to the intense mandatory
disclosure regime offered by securities regulation today.94 Five years
later, Elizabeth de Fontenay gave this thought experiment an empirical
answer in the affirmative, showing that leveraged loan markets are

91. See Davis, supra note 39, at 3. Davis shows that rather than serving as noise
trading that distorts stock prices, individual trading actually increases share price
accuracy. She distinguishes between individual investors and company insiders who
may avail themselves of non-public information before trading. See id. at 2, 15.
92. See RICHARD H. THALER & SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN, Behavioral Economics,
in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS (2d ed.), http://www.econlib.org/library
/Enc/BehavioralEconomics.html# [http://perma.cc/7C6Y-P3WY]. Indeed, the potential
of corporations to act rationally and maximize information prior to investment
allocation was recently empirically demonstrated. See Elisabeth de Fontenay, Do the
Securities Laws Matter? The Rise of the Leveraged Loan Market, 39 J. CORP. L. 725
(2014).
93. Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization
of the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1025-26 (2009).
94. Id.
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functioning as well as bond markets without any disclosure
requirements imposed on the borrowing corporation.95
The implication of this empirical study is that institutional investors
do well in collecting requisite information and negotiating their
investments even in the absence of mandatory securities disclosures.96
Howell Jackson and Eric Pan have shown that the institutional investors
in Securities Act Rule 144A transactions request and receive disclosures
similar to those available in registered offerings.97 Institutional investors
can either do without it or use it when it is available. The American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants’ Special Committee on
Financial Reporting has noted that investors generally find the business
reporting system in the United States to be working well and providing
“users with essential information that heavily influences their
decisions.”98 Retail investors, on the other hand, are less likely to delve
through the bounty of information available at online SEC databases
such as EDGAR.99 Recent empirical studies suggest disclosure is an
inefficient policy for altering individual behavior due to the reluctance
to analyze the overload of information.100 Individual investors can be
overwhelmed with such copious, complex information, and the sheer
volume of disclosures available on EDGAR alone surpasses human
capacity.
D. TRADING METHODOLOGIES
Institutional investors are not only better at collecting and
analyzing information but also are better at utilizing more efficient
95. de Fontenay, supra note 92 (comparing the corporate bonds and loans markets
and showing these markets are rapidly converging despite a lack of regulatory
intervention in the latter).
96. Id.
97. Howell E. Jackson & Eric J. Pan, Regulatory Competition in International
Securities Markets: Evidence from Europe—Part II, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 207, 255-57
(2008).
98. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL REPORTING, AICPA, IMPROVING BUSINESS
REPORTING – A CUSTOMER FOCUS ch. 1 (1994), http://www.aicpa.org/InterestAreas/FR
C/AccountingFinancialReporting/DownloadableDocuments/Jenkins%20Committee%2
0Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/5JSQ-7GEP].
99. See Filings & Forms, SEC (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml
#.VOhwaC42R9A [http://perma.cc/52XP-8RCP].
100. See, e.g., OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU
WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014).
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trading methodologies. In recent years, institutional investors have
frequently used automated platforms for trading by coding a trading
algorithm according to predetermined variables. Algo-trading
technology is used by institutional investors to improve performance on
both risk management and expected return.101 Algo-trading is precise
and informative, and has been shown to narrow spreads, reduce adverse
selection, and reduce trade-related price discovery, all of which
generally improves the liquidity of markets and makes quotes more
informative.102 Retail investors, on the other hand, are heavily
influenced by past performance and tend to make trading decisions on
their own, underperforming benchmarks and selling winning
investments while holding on to losing ones.103
Most algo-trading institutional investors engage in high-speed
trading, where a program automatically trades faster than humans can
respond to data.104 Algo-trading thus generates negative externalities on
retail investors: when others become faster, adverse selection costs for
slow investors increase.105 This result reflects informational asymmetries
between large, fast institutional traders and small, slow retail traders.106
E. SOCIETAL IMPACT
The divergence between retail and institutional investors is
particularly significant in light of the everyday impact that corporations
and their management decisions have on individuals. Corporations serve
a prominent role in society. The public is both heavily influenced and
dependent on the continuous supply of products and services provided
101. See Tom C.W. Lin, The New Financial Industry, 65 ALA. L. REV. 567, 576
(2014).
102. Terrence Hendershott, Charles M Jones & Albert J. Menkveld, Does
Algorithmic Trading Improve Liquidity? 66 J. FIN. 1, 30-31 (2011).
103. Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, The Behavior of Individual Investors, in 2B
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 1533 (George M. Constantinides, et al.
eds., 2011).
104. See Shobhit Seth, Basics of Algorithmic Trading: Concepts and Examples,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/active-trading/101014/basicsalgorithmic-trading-concepts-and-examples.asp [http://perma.cc/2SYE-ZXUZ].
105. Thierry Foucault, Sophie Moinas & Bruno Biais, Equilibrium High Frequency
Trading 2 (Sept. 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1834344
[http://perma.cc/FX3F-3SM8].
106. Id.
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by corporations. Banks are essential for monetary services and credit.
Other corporations supply the public with energy, electricity, and gas,
run major hospitals, provide public transportation, broadband services,
and basic foods, and much more.
Corporations often meet our cultural expectations of life. Everyday,
managements within corporations make financial and functional
decisions that impact the environment as well as product quality,
employee rights, and the financial results of the corporations. Profits
may often be realized by imposing externalities on other stakeholder
constituencies of the corporation or on the general public. Cutting back
on safety expenditures, decreasing employee wages, or reducing
adherence to environmental standards can all improve stock
performance, but this added value for shareholders can also be harmful
for other constituencies of the corporation.107 For institutional investors,
however, this is rarely of interest.108
III. TOWARDS CONVERGENCE
Despite the substantially divergent grounds of corporations and the
general public, there has been an increasing trend towards convergence.
Part III briefly surveys the major streams of convergence: socially
responsible and impact investments, corporate social responsibility,
sustainability reporting, and customer voice platforms.
A. SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENTS AND IMPACT INVESTMENTS
As of 2014, one out of every six dollars invested by institutional
investors who are professional fund managers is reported to take into
account sustainable, responsible and impact investing (SRI)
considerations.109 There is no method for tracing how these
considerations actually affected the investment allocation performed by
money managers between increasing the rate of return and social
107.
108.

See STOUT, supra note 51, at 88.
See infra Part III.A (discussing socially responsible investments and impact
investments as disclaimers where only one out of six dollars invested by institutional
investors takes social considerations into account in investment allocation).
109. The total dollar amount of SRI assets at the beginning of 2014 was $6.57
trillion. See U.S. SIF FOUND., REPORT ON US SUSTAINABLE, RESPONSIBLE AND IMPACT
INVESTING TRENDS 12 (2014), http://www.ussif.org/Files/Publications/SIF_Trends_14.
F.ES.pdf [http://perma.cc/T6WR-5XHV].
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responsibility. Although only a minority of fund managers have been
willing to embrace the larger social mission thus far, even if it is only
through legally unenforceable statements of their intentions, the number
continues to grow.110 A 2008 study found that socially responsible funds
are visible in the proxy process, yet they generally do not receive
majority support.111 By 2012, however, environmental, social, and
governance issues “constituted the majority of all shareholder
proposals.” 112
Concerned that capitalism is not capable of undertaking the
problems facing the economy, investors have been accumulating funds
to invest in impact investments that not only provide a return on
investment, but also target specific social needs and maximize social
goals in general.113 A subset of socially responsible investments, impact
investments seek to allocate funds to particular social goals and projects
while also finding the economic rationale.114 While traditional, socially
responsible investments securitize the investment allocation based on
profit considerations and alter it when externalities exceed the profit to
investors, impact investments seek to create both social and economic
value.115
B. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY116
Corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) refers to the trend among
for-profit corporations of voluntarily adopting extracurricular activities
110.
111.

Id. at 5.
Luc Renneboog, Jenke ter Horst & Chendi Zhang, The Price of Ethics and
Stakeholder Governance: The Performance of Socially Responsible Mutual Funds, 14
J. CORP. FIN. 302 (2008).
112. George Serafeim, The Role of the Corporation in Society: An Alternative View
and Opportunities for Future Research 18 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 14110, 2014), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/14-110_e7a7f1b3-be0d4992-93cc-7a4834daebf1.pdf [http://perma.cc/YVS4-4N88].
113. Olaf Weber, Social Finance and Impact Investing 3-4 (Oct. 11, 2012)
(unpublished working paper), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2160403 [http://perma.cc/SCF6DGJ8].
114. Id. at 10.
115. Id.
116. This section draws largely on my prior scholarly work regarding corporate
social responsibility published and edited by the University of Pennsylvania Journal of
Business Law. See Azgad-Tromer, supra note 34.
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for the benefit of the “other,” including other non-profit organizations
and philanthropies, weak stakeholder groups (such as consumers), or
civil society and the needs of the general public as a whole. Ideas about
CSR emerged in Europe in the interwar period, between 1918 and 1939,
when a few large stock corporations began to dominate the economies
of the West.117 While shareholders of large corporations in the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were often personally involved
in managing or monitoring the corporation, by the beginning of the
twentieth century they were typically absent from management or
production, assuming a passive role, becoming widely dispersed, and
taking little interest in the daily management of the business.118
Ownership and control were separated, and corporations were left to the
leadership of their hired professional managers.119 Accordingly,
shareholders were seen as less central to the corporate ethos, becoming
“anonymous pensioners,” possessing claims to “get something for
nothing” as “absentee owners.”120
CSR originally posed a fundamental challenge to the paradigm of
shareholder primacy, regarded as “a radical reconceptualization of the
corporation of the nature of the corporation . . . underlain by the belief
that is was perfectly legitimate to subordinate the interests of
shareholders to those of other groups, or of society as a whole.”121
Contemporary writers on CSR have adopted a softer approach in which
the social liabilities of corporations are seen as an ameliorative
commitment to shareholders and their property rights.122 As such, ideas
of CSR are seen as a legitimizing tool for corporate externalities,
tempering inequalities in wealth and income that the core property
emphasis on shareholders’ rights and privileges would stress, through
self-regulation, voluntarism and “soft-law.”123
117. See PADDY IRELAND & REGINEE G. PILLAY, Corporate Social Responsibility in
a Neoliberal Age, in CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATORY
GOVERNANCE, TOWARDS INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT? 77, 79-80 (Peter Utting & Jose
Carlos Marques eds., 2010).
118. Id.
119. For an empirical study backing this historical analysis, see ADOLF BERLE &
MEANS GARDINER, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (rev. ed.
1967).
120. See IRELAND & PILLAY, supra note 117; see also THORSTEIN VEBLEN,
ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN RECENT TIMES (1923).
121. IRELAND & PILLAY, supra note 117, at 84.
122. See id. at 88-91.
123. See id.
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The backdrop to the emergence of CSR concepts was the rise of
managerial agents as prominent organs of the corporation whose owners
are passive and widely dispersed. In a series of public correspondences
between Adolf Berle and American corporate lawyer E. Merrick Dodd
from the early 1930s, Berle argued that the fiduciary duties of managers
should be enhanced to prevent the preference of controlling groups of
shareholders over minority groups.124 Dodd suggested that once the
corporation is an independent entity separate from its owners, rather
than an aggregate of stockholders, “there was no reason why it should
not operate through its managerial agents, as a ‘good citizen . . . with a
sense of social responsibility.’”125 Dodd advocated a view of the
corporation not as a purely private enterprise, but as a wider
organization with social responsibilities and obligations.126 By the
1950s, shareholder primacy was seen as “slightly old-fashioned,”127 and
managers were perceived as being in charge of balancing the interests of
different groups connected with the “soulful,” socially responsible
corporation.128 In the 1960s, Berle explicitly rejected shareholder
primacy by describing corporate managers as “administrators of a
community system.”129 Shareholder primacy returned to dominance with
the rise of neoliberal ideology in the financial markets of the 1980s and
1990s.130 Fiercely believing in the forces of the market as efficient and

124. A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45
HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1367 (1932).
125. PADDY IRELAND, Defending the Rentier: Corporate Theory and the RePrivatisation of the Public Company, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE COMPANY
150 (John Parkinson, Gavin Kelly & Andrew Gamble eds., 2000) (quoting E. Merrick
Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1147
(1932)).
126. See Dodd, supra note 125, at 1161.
127. L. C. B. Gower, Shareholder Democracy: A Broader Outlook for
Corporations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 922, 927 (1955) (reviewing FRANK D. EMERSON &
FRANKLIN C. LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY (1954)).
128. Carl Kaysen, The Social Significance of the Modern Corporation, 47 AM.
ECON. REV. 311, 314 (1957).
129. See BRYAN HORRIGAN, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE 21ST
CENTURY: DEBATES, MODELS AND PRACTICES ACROSS GOVERNMENT, LAW AND
BUSINESS 89 (2010) (citing Adolf A. Berle, The Corporation in a Democratic Society,
in MANAGEMENT AND CORPORATIONS 1985 63, 68 (M. Anshen and G. Bach eds.,
1975)).
130. See IRELAND & PILLAY, supra note 117, at 78.
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as the primary facilitator of wealth, neoliberals employed every means
to deregulate and eliminate governmental intervention in the forces of
the free market.131 Shareholders in this period were less dispersed and
came to be represented by only a few institutional investors as claims for
shareholder activism and shareholder value became stronger.132
CSR is often justified from the shareholder value perspective in that
improving environmental and social performance will serve the best
long-term interests of investors, thereby enhancing the overall
shareholder value.133 Under the “doing well by doing good” theory,
promoting the needs of other stakeholders can improve financial
performance.134 For example, employee training and product
development leads to better product quality.135
In Individual and Corporate Responsibility, Ronald Bénabou and
Jean Tirole discuss three alternative visions of CSR.136 Vision 1 is the
“win-win” approach, under which the incentive for CSR stems naturally
and inherently from the promotion of shareholders’ interests in
profits.137 When firms fail to accommodate CSR, they in fact reduce
shareholder value by focusing on the short term.138 Bénabou and Tirole
give the example of a firm that may reduce costs by reneging on a
contract with its labor or suppliers so as to reduce costs, which would
damage the long-term goodwill of the different constituencies, making it
more difficult to either attract motivated employees or induce suppliers
to make long-term investments.139
CSR under this first vision is in fact a means of maximizing profits
and enhancing shareholder value in the long run. The academic support
for CSR often comes from the value it brings to shareholders such as
131.
132.
133.

See id. at 85.
See DOUG HENWOOD, WALL STREET: HOW IT WORKS AND FOR WHOM (1997).
Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value, HARV. BUS.
REV. Jan.–Feb. 2011, at 62, 64-65.
134. Serafeim, supra note 112, at 2 (citing Joshua D. Margolis, Hillary Anger
Elfenbein & James P. Walsh, Does It Pay To Be Good? A Meta-Analysis and
Redirection of Research on the Relationship between Corporate Social and Financial
Performance (Nov. 1, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.hks.harvard.edu/mrcbg/papers/seminars/margolis_november_07.pdf [http://perma.cc/LN5C-V2NW]).
135. Id. at 2.
136. Ronald Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Individual and Corporate Social
Responsibility, 77 ECONOMICA 1, 9-12 (2010).
137. Id. at 9-10.
138. Id. at 10.
139. Id.
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greater access to finance or a heightened corporate reputation.140 CSR
was found to have a small, yet significant, positive impact on
profitability.141 Recently, sustainable organizations, defined as
organizations that voluntarily integrated social and environmental issues
into their business model strategy, were found to outperform their lower
sustainability peers over an eighteen-year horizon, both in stock markets
and in operational performance.142
Of course, there is no consensus on this win-win approach. Because
the corporation is a distributional platform, stakeholder constituencies
do not always have aligned interests. Companies engaging in
environmental and social issues might underperform and “be eliminated
by competitors who choose not to be so civic minded, or will survive
only by consuming their economic rents in this manner.”143 Paying more
to employees and engaging in environmental mitigation can often
enhance agency costs, implying negative financial implications for the
corporation.144 “The social responsibility of business is to increase its
profits,” according to Milton Friedman,145 but today’s investors seem to
care about the broader CSR and ethics issues, often considering it a
potential concern that can translate into financial consequences.146

140. Beiting Cheng, Ioannis Ioannou & George Serafeim, Corporate Social
Responsibility and Access to Finance, 35 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1, 6 (2013); Charles J.
Fombrun, Naomi A. Gardberg & Michael L. Barnett, Opportunity Platforms and Safety
Nets: Corporate Citizenship and Reputational Risk, 105 BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 85, 85-86
(2000).
141. Margolis, Elfenbein & Walsh, supra note 134.
142. Robert G. Eccles, Ioannis Ioannou & George Serafeim, The Impact of
Corporate Sustainability on Organizational Processes and Performance, 60 MGMT.
SCI. 2835, 2836 (2014).
143. Michael Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory and the Corporate
Objective Function, 22 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 2010, at 32, 39.
144. William O. Brown, Eric Helland & Janet Kiholm Smith, Corporate
Philanthropic Practices, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 855, 856 (2006).
145. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its
Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at 122.
146. LYNN S. PAINE, VALUE SHIFT: WHY COMPANIES MUST MERGE SOCIAL AND
FINANCIAL IMPERATIVES TO ACHIEVE SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE 15-16 (2003) (citing
research by the Society of Consumer Affairs).

2016]

CORPORATIONS AND THE 99%

191

A recent empirical study explored the impact of CSR ratings on
sell-side analysts’ assessments of firms’ future financial performance.147
It found that in the early 1990s, analysts issued more pessimistic
recommendations for firms with high CSR ratings, but in more recent
years, analysts progressively assess these firms less pessimistically, and
eventually, optimistically.148 Everyone wants to fly the cheapest airline
as consumers, earn better wages as employees, and receive higher
returns as investors, but the corporation has a bounded supply of
resources and often becomes a platform for distributional justice.
Vision 2 is labeled “delegated philanthropy” by Bénabou and
Tirole.149 Under this view, the firm is a channel for the expression of
different constituencies, and the corporation’s management caters to
demand by supplying the stakeholders’ need to engage in charity while
maximizing profit.150 As Bénabou and Tirole point out, it is necessary to
explain why the corporation is the adequate social vehicle for this
philanthropy.151 In theory, Starbucks’s consumers could send charitable
donations directly to the workers in the coffee plantations.152 The
explanation Bénabou and Tirole suggest is transaction cost savings.153
Since the corporation is already involved in a transaction with the
workers, it is much cheaper for it to forward them the donation.154

147. See Ioannis Ioannou & George Serafeim, The Impact of Corporate Social
Responsibility on Investment Recommendations: Analysts’ Perceptions and Shifting
Institutional Logics, 36 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1053 (2015).
148. Id. at 1054.
149. Bénabou & Tirole, supra note 136, at 10.
150. Id. at 11
151. Id. at 10.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. Obviously, there is some circularity in this answer. There is no doubt that
the corporation can deal with the workers more efficiently and for less transaction costs,
but the real question is why do we use the corporate vehicle as a social means for
charity to begin with. Why do we find the corporate relationship we have with other
stakeholder constituencies to raise a justification for charity to begin with? In theory, if
consumer citizens are bothered by work conditions in Africa, they can collect and send
money to the group in need even if not directly in a relationship with them (one can
assume workers for Dunkin Donuts coffee enjoy no better terms of employment, and
from a human rights standpoint, there is no justification for why we should support only
the workers working directly on our personal cup of latte). The apparent answer is that
we find a need to support those in relationship to our actual lives, even if indirectly and
through the channel of a for-profit organization.
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Bénabou and Tirole label Vision 3 “insider-initiated corporate
philanthropy.” This vision reflects management’s personal need or
willingness to contribute money to a good cause and using “others’
money” for that purpose.155
As it currently stands, CSR is a voluntary practice. In a
communication from the European Union, CSR is defined as “a concept
whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their
business operations and in their interactions with their stakeholders on a
voluntary basis.”156 Voluntary commitments are, alas, limited in their
strength and ability to create incentives for legal compliance. It is often
argued that corporate commitment to ideas of CSR is largely empty.157
For example, the Christian Aid Report, Behind the Mask: The Real Face
of Corporate Social Responsibility, lists a string of transgressions by
corporations that “espouse voluntary approaches” to CSR
commitments.158 This list includes Shell, which officially strives to be a
good neighbor but “fails to quickly clean up oil spills that ruin villages;”
British American Tobacco, which stresses its commitment to high
standards of health and safety but is reported to have “chronic ill-health
related to tobacco cultivation;” and Coca-Cola, which states it uses
“natural resources responsibly” but is claimed to have a “wholly owned
subsidiary in India [that] is accused of depleting village wells in an area
where water is notoriously scarce.”159
Perhaps due to the lack of external standardization, CSR is often
considered a public relations endeavor, where the real value given to
155. Id. at 11. This vision is easily objectionable on corporate governance grounds.
See Friedman, supra note 145; see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm., 558
U.S. 310, 474 (2008) (discussing the issue of political donations conducted by
corporations, giving rise to questions of agency costs and management’s personal
political agendas promoted at the shareholders’ expense); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert
J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 8789 (2010).
156. See Ireland & Pillay, supra note 117, at 90 (citing Communication from the
Commission Concerning Corporate Social Responsibility: A Business Contribution to
Sustainable Development, COM (2002) 347 final (July 2, 2002)).
157. See Ireland & Pillay, supra note 117, at 94 (“CSR is often treated by
corporations as little more than a public relations or window dressing exercise . . .”).
158. See CHRISTIAN AID, BEHIND THE MASK: THE REAL FACE OF CORPORATE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 15 (2007), http://baierle.files.wordpress.com/2007/11/behindmask.pdf [http://perma.cc/RS6U-P2TL].
159. See id. at 2.
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society is not comparable to the negative externalities imposed on the
public. Destruction of nature and of social morality may be justified
with meager donations, with no real estimation of the cost-benefit
analysis from the general public’s perspective. Like the Once-Ler in The
Lorax who rationalizes his corporation’s destruction of the environment
by singing, “How ba-a-a-ad can I be? A portion of proceeds goes to
charity,”160 CSR provides corporations with a narrative of societal
consciousness that allows them to rationalize harmful corporate
behavior. For example, a corporation failing to return debt to creditors
may hurt millions of retirees while enjoying the status of a CSR
promoter due to a meager donation to the preschool of the CEO’s
daughter. CSR allows tax deductions for the – often minor – expense
and provides great public relations value. “All the customers are
buying,” sings the Once-ler, “and the PR people are lying.”161
Mandatory CSR is not common in the western world but was
recently adopted in China and India. In China, Article 5 of the Company
Law requires companies to “undertake social responsibility” in the
course of business.162 In 2013, India adopted a corporate law that
requires large companies to invest in sustainable initiatives and engage
in CSR activities with two percent of their average net profits.163
C. SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING
Sustainability reporting is a method of nonfinancial information
management. It requires the reporting of information about
environmental, social, and corporate governance performance. A
company must provide this information to investors through a
systematic platform “at par with financial reporting in terms of rigor,
credibility and comparability.”164 Sustainability reporting is thus the

160.
161.
162.

See THE LORAX (Universal Pictures 2012).
Id.
Ioannis Ioannou & George Serafeim, The Consequences of Mandatory
Corporate Sustainability Reporting: Evidence from Four Countries 9 (Harv. Bus. Sch.,
Working Paper No. 11-100, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1799589 [http://perma.cc/L4P7-YJZE].
163. Section 135 of the new Act requires that the Board of Directors ensure that at
least 2% of the company’s average net profits during the three preceding years be spent
on Corporate Social Responsibility policy. For the full version of the law, see The
Companies Act, No. 18 of 2013, India Code (2013).
164. Ioannou & Serafeim, supra note 162, at 6.
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transparency platform for assessing the nonfinancial performance of
corporations.
The history of sustainability reporting is rather short and runs back
to the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster, after which the Coalition for
Environmentally Responsible Economies (“CERES”) introduced
environmental reporting guidelines on behalf of the Social Investment
Forum (“SIF”).165 The Global Reporting Initiative (“GRI”) was launched
in 1997 by CERES and the United Nations Environmental Program
(“UNEP”), proposing an alternative “triple bottom line” accounting for
economic, social, and environmental corporate performance.166 It is
becoming highly customary for public corporations to disclose
sustainability information. By 2013, more than 6,000 companies were
issuing sustainability reports,167 with 499 of the 500 S&P 500 companies
having either made a sustainability disclosure or linked financial
performance with a sustainability initiative.168 Sustainability indices and
funds emerged at stock exchanges,169 and a new C-level executive
position was established in many companies to oversee sustainabilityrelated issues.170
Lately, an increasing number of nations are mandating corporate
disclosure of environmental, social and governance information.171 As of
2015, mandatory non-financial disclosure regulations are prevalent in
Denmark, South Africa, China, Malaysia, Brazil, Hong Kong, and
India.172 As of 2013, United Kingdom regulations require that large,
publically traded corporations file “strategic reports,” which must
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2.
See Integrated Financial and Sustainability Reporting in the United States
(IRRC Institute, 2013), http://irrcinstitute.org/pdf/FINAL_Integrated_Financial_Sustain
_Reporting_April_2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/K7WQ-B7HN].
169. Such indices and funds include the Dow Jones Sustainability Indices, the
FTSE4GOOD Index Series, Ethibel funds, Domini Social Investments (including the
Domini 400 Social Index), the Vanguard Calvert Social Index Fund, and the Corporate
Governance Quotient (CGQ). See Ioannou & Serafeim, supra note 147, at 1058.
170. See id. (“AT&T, Blackstone, BT, Dow Chemical, Nestle, SAP, Siemens,
Unilever, among many others”).
171. See Ioannou & Serafeim, supra note 162, at 2 (depending on the country,
mandated corporate disclosure has been accomplished either through laws or through
stock exchange listing requirements).
172. Id.
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include information about corporate performance indicators, which
effectively measure the company’s business position and its
performance, as well as information about environmental matters, the
company’s employees, social community, and human rights issues.173 A
recently published study suggests that mandatory sustainability
disclosures are associated with increases in firm valuations.174 Like any
disclosure regime, sustainability reporting is likely to affect the ex-ante
incentives of the management of reporting corporations in areas of
performance that are subject to disclosure.175
Mandatory disclosures of nonfinancial information only apply to
publicly traded corporations, due to their public funding rather than their
public function or importance. Listed corporations are typically larger,
and the public funding may well correlate with the public role of
corporations. However, applying sustainability only to listed
corporations surely misses some privately funded corporations with
significant public roles. Applying the enhanced disclosure regime to a
narrow group of corporations that are of interest to investors overlooks
those corporations that are significant to the wider and more diverse
general public.
Sustainability is the business of society as a whole, not only of
investors. A study by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board
found that “50 percent of disclosures related to environmental and social
issues [were] immaterial [to] the future long-term financial performance
of the company.”176 The target audience of sustainability reporting is the
general public, but in practice, sustainability reporting is typically
integrated or adjusted to the financial reporting and directed at the
investor base.177 Nonfinancial information on corporate performance is
available on EDGAR, which is used mainly by institutional investors.178
The significant amount of nonfinancial information falls mostly on the
institutional investors’ deaf ears. As shown earlier, institutional
investors are mostly reluctant to engage with the nonfinancial aspects of
173. The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations
2013, 2013, S.I. 1970 (U.K.).
174. See Ioannou & Serafeim, supra note 162, at 21.
175. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fichel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 714 (1984).
176. Serafeim, supra note 112, at 3.
177. Ioannou & Serafeim, supra note 162, at 4-5.
178. See Filings & Forms, SEC (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml
[http://perma.cc/52XP-8RCP].
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investments.179 The general public is hardly aware of information
available at EDGAR. A small percentage of the trading public is made
up of individuals, and of these few, even fewer read the corporate
filings.
D. CUSTOMER VOICE
When consumers speak, corporations should listen, especially since
consumers share information with one another. Word-of-mouth
consumer advice is one of the most effective marketing strategies. We
are all more inclined to purchase what our peers and social
acquaintances enjoy and recommend. The effectiveness of the consumer
voice can be attributed to both a cognitive bias that causes us to overevaluate the easily accessibility and the reliability of a peer review from
a disinterested party who typically has no clear conflict of interest with
us, unlike corporate retailers.
With the abundance of Internet platforms, consumers are able to
share information with one another cheaply and quickly. In addition,
they are able to distribute their advice to a far larger group than that in
their immediate physical proximity. Internet platforms enable consumers
to share their reviews about the products and services they have used,
and to pass that knowledge to future consumers who are faced with a
consumption choice.180 Typically, both the participation in information
sharing and the consumption thereof are available to all, free of charge,
online.
The Internet digitally revives Habermas’s lost public sphere, which
refers to a mezzanine sphere between the state and society where people
179.
180.

See supra Part I.A.
A sincere question that arises in that regard is why a person would be
motivated to participate in such a review process, which on the surface does not and
would not appear to be profitable. Considering the meager cost and limited time
commitment of creating a review, it is easy to see why consumers would be willing to
share their opinions and thereby help future consumers. One such consumer motivation
would be to help and thank the for a good product or service. On the contrary, another
motivation could be to complain about bad products or services. The potential to voice
one’s opinion as a consumer empowers the consumer dramatically, and as every single
consumer is becoming able to mass distribute her opinions online, sellers view each of
their consumers’ satisfaction as a major means of marketing. To learn more about
decentralized cooperation and motivation, see YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF
NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2005).
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come together and engage in noncompulsory conversation.181 The
traditional communication environment dictated an asymmetry of
information between sellers and consumers. This asymmetry was
enabled by the scarcity of access to media as well as the structure of the
markets, with dispersed consumers who were unable to act collectively
and share information with one another. Conversely, the Internet
provides a framework for costless collective consumer discussions and
sharing of information.
Unlike twentieth-century communication spheres, which were
modeled on a few influencers talking to the public (few-to-many), the
Internet is a stage open to all where anyone may talk at will (many-tomany). In addition, listeners are able to search electronically through the
mass of information and find that which is most relevant to them.
Customers speak directly, not only to their sellers in the customer
service lane, but also to their peer consumers, on a variety of social
media websites and in the framework of diverse consumer communities
that develop online. These communities are digital meeting places where
consumers who share similar needs can share their experiences with one
another.182 Structurally, the Internet provides a communal framework for
consumption, where each consumer can share her experience with all
others, and future consumers of a product can learn from the experience
of the product’s previous consumers by a simple web search, even when

181. In a most influential work, Jürgen Habermas argues that the democratic public
sphere developed during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and declined
throughout the twentieth century. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL
TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF
BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (Thomas Burger trans. assisted by Frederick Lawrence, 1989)
(1962). Unlike Habermas’s public sphere, users of the Internet do not meet in person.
Some argue, based on this shortfall, that the Internet does not meet Habermas’s
definition. See, e.g., Mark Poster, Cyber Democracy: The Internet and the Public
Sphere, in READING DIGITAL CULTURE (David Trend ed., 2001). However, the
flourishing abundance of digitized social networks (i.e., Facebook) shows that physical
presence is no longer a requirement for communal and social engagements. A public
sphere for public discussions by individuals may well be virtual.
182. Consider, for example, communities of young mothers sharing information on
baby care products. Some of these Internet consumer communities are sponsored and
hosted by the sellers themselves. For example, see the StrongMoms Community hosted
by Similac, which was hosted on Similac’s webpage but has recently been migrated to
Similac’s Facebook page. See SIMILAC, http://similac.com/community/boards/discussio
n_boards/f [http://perma.cc/C6RT-CSXE]; Similac US, FACEBOOK, http://www.face
book.com/Similac [http://perma.cc/A6ZR-YHUP].
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such other consumers are total strangers living in different cultures and
continents.
Under the traditional consumption model, the asymmetry between
sellers and consumers has led to the characterization of the consumer as
an antihero, an insignificant part of the crowd who lacks any unique
skills regarding the object of consumption and rarely takes a significant
role in facilitating the consumption transaction.183 But today, the
argument for asymmetry of information has weakened. The Internet is
the ultimate framework for the expression of the wisdom of the crowds,
and it has the potential to move toward a utopian model for consumer
organizations and for consumer influence on commercial life.184 The
consumer is regaining dominance: she knows more about each of her
purchased products, and voices her opinions about them, posting her
consumption experience in a public arena exposed for all Internet users
to see.185 The consumer thereby strengthens the incentives of
corporations to gratify consumers and listen to their voice by increasing
the stakes of reputational damage. In fact, in 2006, TIME chose the
consumer, i.e., the reader, as the “Person of the Year.”186
Sellers can easily censor unfavorable and unwelcome reviews on
their own company websites, and are strongly incentivized to do so;
183.
184.

Azgad-Tromer, supra note 34, at 250-253.
See, e.g., JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE
SMARTER THAN THE FEW AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS,
ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES AND NATIONS (2004). (A good illustration of this model in
current Internet consumption can be found in sites such as epinions.com, where
consumers get access to the accumulated collective treasury of consumer knowledge
regarding a variety of products. Each consumer can join the community and add
reviews at will. While these websites represent independent consumer organizations,
some sellers offer a collection of consumer reviews in their merchandising sites as well.
For example, Sears sets a platform for consumer reviews on all offered products, and
summarizes the results for future consumers by posting the average grade given by
previous consumers (on a five-star scale). See SEARS, http://www.sears.com
[http://perma.cc/X93F-Q8UW]. Interestingly, the accumulated wisdom of previous
consumers is summarized by the seller voluntarily even when the grade given to the
offered product is below average.
185. Information uploaded on the Internet is irreversible in the sense that no option
to delete it exists. Once data has been uploaded to the Internet, no agent is able to deny
future users from accessing that data.
186. See Lev Grossman, You — Yes, You — Are TIME’s Person of the Year, TIME
(Dec. 25, 2013), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1569514,00.html
[http://perma.cc/W6SH-Q4SL].
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however, they are exposed to a variety of platforms, forums, and social
media, which document consumer complaints and expose unfavorable
information to a wide public of prospective customers. One web
platform for consumers’ commercial speech that merits a closer look is
Yelp.187 A contraction of yellow pages, Yelp provides product
information about businesses in various categories, including dining,
entertainment, retail, travel, and professional services throughout the
United States. In a typical search, performed from any web browser,
including those on mobile devices, consumers define what they are
seeking (e.g., an auto body shop), and the location in which the search is
to be performed (neighborhood, city, or zip code). In response, Yelp
provides a list of businesses, each accompanied with a five-point
average consumer rating, reviews from other consumers, and general
contact information, including the business address, hours and parking
options.
Yelp is a dynamic source of product information, boosted by a
vibrant community of users, some of whom have a reputation for being
reliable, prolific, and/or tasteful in their consumption habits. Users have
their own pages listing their previous reviews, thereby enabling other
users to follow their consumption habits and opinions, contributing to
the creation an online community of consumers. With over 83 million
cumulative reviews of local businesses, Yelp creates an abundance of
consumer knowledge.188 However, this consumer utopia is not to be
overrated. Yelp solicits business owners to join a “Sponsorship
Program” that allows businesses to bring a favorite review to the top of
the page.189 According to its 10-K filings for 2013, Yelp generates
revenue primarily from the sale of advertising on its website and mobile
app to small businesses.190
Because customer opinion significantly impacts sales, some
corporations have adopted a more intense listening regime by taking
customer complaints into serious and immediate consideration.
Corporations have demonstrated an effort to create customer satisfaction
187.
188.

YELP, http://www.yelp.com [http:// perma.cc/G294-5XV2].
See Yelp 2Q15 Data Sheet, YELP, http://www.yelp-ir.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=25
0809&p=irol-irhome [http://perma.cc/8PGV-V9CQ].
189. See Sarah Duxbury, Restaurants Learn to Yelp: Eateries Give Mixed Reviews:
It’s a Service or a Shakedown, S.F. BUS. TIMES, (Jun. 29, 2008, 9:00 PM),
http://sanfrancisco.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/stories/2008/06/30/story1.html
[http://perma.cc/9LBN-DX8G].
190. See Yelp Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 3, 2013).
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and avoid the ill effects of web-based negative customer speech, and
have also attempted to listen to their customers directly, bypassing both
Yelp and social media platforms. Accordingly, supporting mobile
applications were recently developed to allow direct communication
between the retail consumers and the corporations.191 Some of these
applications have features that allow corporations to track conversations
taking place on social networks, news websites, blogs and forums,
allowing customer support agents to know whether they need to engage
with customers immediately in order to resolve issues or complaints.192
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A. THE PURPOSE OF CORPORATE LAW: INVESTOR PROTECTION AND
SOCIAL WELFARE
Corporate governance rules were designed to enhance public
funding by providing adequate protection to investors. There are two
rival systems of corporate governance. The first is a concentrated
ownership system that is characterized by controlling block
shareholders, high private benefits of control, and weak securities
markets with low disclosure and market transparency standards.193 The
second is a dispersed ownership system that is characterized by strong
securities markets, rigorous disclosure standards, and high market
transparency.194 In the dispersed ownership system, the market for
corporate control constitutes the ultimate disciplinary mechanism.195
Share ownership in the United States remains dispersed in most large
public companies, and it is rare to find a single shareholder owning
more than 5% of a big public firm, despite the rise of institutional
investors.196 Legal scholars debate the merits of each of these systems

191. See OWNERLISTENS, http://www.ownerlistens.com [http://perma.cc/YPG9EDAC].
192. See ENGAGOR, http://www.engagor.com [http://perma.cc/M7GP-8DGL].
193. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanos & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate
Ownership around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 471-74 (1999).
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. Stout, supra note 83, at 3.
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and whether this dichotomy can persist in an increasingly competitive
global capital market.197
In particular, corporate law scholars debate the origins of dispersed
ownership. Professors Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanos, and
Andrei Shleifer place legal variables at center stage, arguing that the
legal foundations for investor protection are the fuel behind public
investments in corporations.198 They find that countries with weaker
investor protections, measured by both the character of the legal rules
and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital
markets.199 These findings apply to both equity and debt markets.
Research suggests that French civil law countries have both the weakest
investor protections and the least developed capital markets, especially
as compared to common law countries.200 Harvard law professors
Lucian Bebchuk and Mark Roe offer an alternative theory:
[T]he corporate structures that an economy has at any point in time
depend in part on those it had at earlier times. . . . First, the corporate
structures of an economy depend on the structures with which the
economy started. Initial ownership structures have such an effect
because they affect the identity of the structure that would be
efficient for any given company and because they can give some
parties both incentives and power to impede changes in them.
Second, corporate rules, which affect ownership structures, will
themselves depend on the corporate structures with which the
economy started. Initial ownership structures can affect both the
identity of the rules that would be efficient and the interest group
201
politics that can determine which rules would actually be chosen.

Alternatively, Columbia law professor John Coffee turns to a
political explanation, suggesting that the principal variable in the
development of dispersed ownership in the United States and the United
Kingdom was the separation of the markets from politics in the late
nineteenth century, placing control in the discipline of the markets rather
than in the hands of controlling shareholders.202
197. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and
the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 3-4 (2001).
198. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanos & Shleifer, supra note 193, at 476-80.
199. Id.
200. See id.
201. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in
Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 127 (1999).
202. Coffee, supra note 197, at 8-9.
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Regardless of the origins of dispersed ownership, it is dispersed
ownership that shaped corporate law. Modern corporate law was
designed to expand the family business and provide the legal
foundations for mass investment in other people’s businesses, fueling
the growing economy.203 Whether as a means of enhancing public
investments, or as a means of reducing contractual costs for business
cooperation by providing a cheaper organizational platform for the
requisite nexus of contracts, corporate law provides the foundations for
investor protection in incorporated business endeavors.
The basic legal characteristics of the business corporation–legal
personality, limited liability, transferable shares, delegated management
under a board structure, and investor ownership–all conform to the
investor protection motivation of corporate law.204 By permitting the
corporation to function as a single contracting party, a “separate
patrimony” distinct from the individuals who own it and their assets,
corporate law reduces the cost of lending to the corporation and protects
creditors.205 Asset partitioning reduces the cost of capital by isolating
separate lines of credit and allowing better evaluation and monitoring of
the shielded entity by potential creditors.206 Limited liability, which “has
become a nearly universal feature of the corporate form,” protects equity
investors by shielding shareholders’ assets from the corporate asset pull
in case of corporate failure.207 Transferable shares provide investors an
exit from their investments, allowing liquidation and diversity of the
investment portfolio, and lowering the risk in commitment to
investment. The separation of ownership and control, and the delegation
of management to a board of directors, provide further investor
protection by forming a “mediating hierarchy” committed to
professional management for running the common business of the
corporation and its shared pull of assets.208 In public corporations with a
majority of independent board members, investor protection is further

203. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End Of History For Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 439 (2000).
204. HANSMANN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 19, at 1.
205. Id at 7.
206. Id. at 10.
207. Id. at 9.
208. Blair & Stout, supra note 5, at 250-56.
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enhanced by providing a commitment to impartial leadership.209 Finally,
investors are protected by default rules providing them control of the
firm through exclusive voting rights, and they retain the right to receive
the firm’s residual net earnings in proportion to the amount of capital
contributed to the firm.210
The underlying motivation to protect retail investors is also
apparent in the tendency to enact financial legislation in times of
crisis.211 For example, “[t]he Future Trading Act of 1921, the first
federal statute regulating commodity futures markets, was enacted in the
wake of the most severe recession in the United States up to that
time.”212 The federal securities laws enacted in the 1930s were a
response to the 1929 stock market crash and the Great Depression.213
Yale law professor Roberta Romano suggests that similar circumstances
attended the initiation of the Sarbanes-Oxley governance mandates as
well.214 Historical research suggests that financial legislation during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the United Kingdom and the
United States was adopted “only after stock market declines, which, by
1837, coincided with economic contractions.”215 Crises have spurred
political action to craft emergency financial legislation aimed at saving
the public.
Considering the goal of corporate law, this underlying motivation
to protect retail investors is of particular interest. The general normative
objective of all fields of law is presumably to increase the aggregate
welfare of society−the whole social pie−thereby serving the best
interests of the entire human population.216 In corporate law, most
scholars work under the assumption that the corporation’s purpose is to
serve the best interest of shareholders and, more specifically, to enhance
209. Ran Duchin, John G. Matsusaka, and Oguzhan Ozbas, When Are Outside
Directors Effective?, 96 J. FIN. ECON. 195 (2010); Lauren Cohen, Andrea Frazzini, and
Christopher Malloy, Hiring Cheerleaders: Board Appointments of ‘Independent’
Directors’, 58 MGMT. SCI. 1039 (2012).
210. HANSMANN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 18, at 14.
211. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1591-99 (2005).
212. Id. at 1591.
213. Romano, supra note 211, at 1592.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1593 (citing STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES
REGULATION: CULTURAL AND POLITICAL ROOTS, 1690-1860, at 257 (1998)).
216. See HANSMANN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 18, at 28 (aggregate welfare refers
to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency).
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shareholder value by increasing the market price of shares.217 This
precedence of shareholders’ interests is not established on a normative
distributional preference. If shareholders were to enrich themselves at
the expense of making other stakeholders worse off, there would be little
academic support for the gain.218 Yet, the platform for investor
protection provided by corporate law and securities regulation now
serves the institutional investors.
Using shareholder value as a heuristic for social value is based on
the residual nature of shareholder interests and the identical character of
shareholders as representatives of the public. If a particular agent is
getting only the last piece of the pie, that agent has strong incentives to
make sure the pie is as large as possible to begin with.219 “[A]s the
firm’s residual claimants and risk bearers [shareholders] have a direct
pecuniary interest in making sure that corporate transactions are
beneficial, not just to the shareholders, but to all parties who deal with
the firm.”220 Shareholder value draws primary attention because it seems
to serve as a heuristic for the aggregate social pie. As Bebchuk writes:
My support . . . is not motivated by political ideas but rather by the
goal of making a market institution–the modern publicly traded
company–function better. . . . I support a viable shareholder power to
replace directors only because I view it as a valuable instrument for
enhancing shareholder value by making boards more accountable
221
and more attentive to shareholder interests.

Additionally, in the words of Judge Frank Easterbrook and
University of Chicago law professor Daniel Fischel:
[M]aximizing profits for equity investors assists the other
“constituencies” automatically. . . . A successful firm provides jobs
for workers and goods and services for consumers. . . . Wealthy
firms provide better working conditions and clean up their outfalls;

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 28.
Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV.
675, 678-79 (2007).
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high profits produce social wealth that strengthens the demand for
222
cleanliness.

But this logic does not take into account the identity of
shareholders. When shareholders are retail investors, and therefore
members of the general public, they always have additional capacities,
for example, as consumers, or even as persons living in the
corporation’s neighborhood that is potentially affected by its business.
When shareholders are institutional investors, they usually have a single
purpose in mind: increasing profits for their own or their client’s
accounts. Individual shareholders reduce the likelihood of conflicts of
interest between various stakeholder groups.
Consider, for example, two road-paving companies. In Company A,
shareholders are mostly individuals. In Company B, shareholders are
mostly institutional investors. Shareholders of Company A drive to work
and live in the areas that Company A paves. If the corporation pollutes,
the shareholders and their children breathe the polluted air. If the
corporation paves a noisy road, shareholders’ work suffers the risk of
distraction. If the corporation fails to assess the transportation volume
accurately, shareholders sit in traffic. In addition to considering their
own interests in their other capacities with the corporation, individual
shareholders frequently make decisions that take into account payoffs to
others, act altruistically, and are “extremely sensitive to the signals . . .
about the expectations, needs, attitudes, identities and likely behavior of
the people around us.”223 Shareholders in Company B are institutional
investors. Generally, institutional investors are solely interested in the
rates of return and only a minority take additional considerations into
account. Using individual shareholders’ interests as a heuristic for
aggregate social welfare makes sense when looking at the potential for
distributional conflicts between various stakeholder groups. But when
the shareholders are mostly institutional investors, as in the case of
Company B, the likelihood of distributional conflicts between various
stakeholder groups is higher because the spectrum of objectives taken
into account by institutional investors does not match individuals’
thought processes and decision-making patterns. Therefore, it does not
make sense to use institutional investors’ interests as a heuristic for the
aggregate social welfare.
222. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 38 (1991).
223. Stout, supra note 83, at 14.
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An alternative justification for shareholder primacy involves
contracting costs.224 Creditors, employees, and customers have fixed
claims on the corporation and thus could obtain suitable protection and
better information enabling them to remain indifferent to the policy
adopted by the management.225 Shareholders’ residual claims, in
contrast, have an open-ended association and thus should be entitled to
leveraged protection, as they are most likely to be affected by corporate
policy.226 But this argument also applies to the 99%, who live alongside
the corporation and are directly impacted by its externalities. If the
open-ended association is the argument for primacy, then the general
public should be the primary corporate constituency.
B. BOUNDED FIDUCIARY DUTY
The reluctance of institutional investors to engage in nonfinancial
investment considerations is legally rooted in their bounded fiduciary
duties.227 Institutional investors trading on behalf of their clients and
advising their clients’ securities selection are bound by fiduciary duties,
under either the federal securities laws or the common law of agency, or
both.228 Fiduciary duties are aimed at mitigating the agency costs caused
by the divergent interests and risk tolerance of the client and the
institutional investors representing her.229
The core fiduciary duties are loyalty and care. The duty of loyalty
regulates potential conflicts of interest and proscribes misappropriation,
while the duty of care establishes a professional benchmark for
“reasonableness” and “prudence.”230 Yet, despite the broad spectrum of
human objectives, the United States Department of Labor clarified in a
224. Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of
Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1, 46-57 (2004).
225. Id.
226. Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 416-19.
227. Andreas G. F. Hoepner, Michael Rezec & Sebastian Siegl, Does Pension
Funds’ Fiduciary Duty Prohibit the Integration of Environmental Responsibility
Criteria in Investment Processes? A Realistic Prudent Investment Test 2 (Sept. 19,
2011) (unpublished working paper), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1930189 [http://perma.cc/RGT4-2FCJ].
228. Robert H. Sitkoff, The Fiduciary Obligations of Financial Advisers Under the
Law of Agency, 27 J. Fin. Plan. 42, 48 (2014).
229. Id. at 43.
230. Id. at 44.
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2008 Labor Bulletin that ERISA prohibits investment decisions based
on nonfinancial factors.231 Institutional investors are bound to enhance
financial value; indeed, that is the legal purpose of their
institutionalization.232 Bridging the gaps between ethics and business is a
challenge, as the objectives and methods of both often face conflicts in
investment allocation. Perhaps due to fear of political intervention, or
the potentially substantial cost of aligning social and financial goals into
one socially responsible investment policy, the policy guiding the
pension savings under ERISA purposefully blinds itself to the
underlying human interests of its clients.233
Back in the 1980s, ethical investments used “negative screening,”
banning investments in enterprises based on religious or political
divergence. For example, in Board of Trustees v. City of Baltimore, the
Maryland Court of Appeals upheld Baltimore City Ordinance No. 765
banning pension funds’ investments in companies doing business in
South Africa.234 The risk of subverting investors’ interests into politics
has raised an academic debate, with most scholars accepting the view in
the Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer 2005 report.235 The report concluded
that pension funds are legally required to consider environmental, social,
and governance considerations if there is a clear consensus amongst
beneficiaries in favor of this criterion or the criterion is believed to be
financially beneficial.236 However, this is a high bar to overcome;
therefore, the bottom line is that environmental, social, and governance
considerations remain secondary to the financial interest.
In the years following the most recent financial crisis, responsible
investment strategies became more widely adopted. In 2009, a report by
231.
232.

See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-2 (2008).
See David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J.
181, 181 (2013).
233. Timothy Adler & Mark Kritzman, The Cost of Socially Responsible Investing,
35 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 52 (2008).
234. Bd. of Trs. v. Mayor of Balt., 562 A.2d 720, 746 (Md. 1989).
235. Charles E. Rounds, Jr., Why Social Investing Threatens Public Pension Funds,
Charitable Trusts, and the Social Security Trust Fund, in PENSION FUNDS POLITICS:
THE DANGERS OF SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING 56 (Jon Entine ed., 2005);
FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER, A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTEGRATION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES IN INVESTMENT DECISIONS
(2005), http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/freshfields_legal_resp_200511
23.pdf [http://perma.cc/U69W-2ZPK]; see Hoepner, Rezec & Siegl, supra note 227,
(surveying the academic support for the Freshfields report).
236. FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER, supra note 235, at 13.
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the asset management group of the United Nations Environmental
Program Finance Initiative stated, “Fiduciaries must recognise that
integrating [environmental, social and governance] issues into
investment and ownership processes is part of responsible investment,
and is necessary to managing risk and evaluating opportunities for longterm investment.”237 This report framed the environmental, social, and
governance investment considerations as a proactive obligation of
institutional investors that is inherent to their professional duties.238
According to the report, failure to comply with this obligation may be
considered negligence.239 In 2014, Institutional Shareholder Services
issued policy guidelines for voting on SRI environmental, social and
governance issues.240 Later that year, a collection of academic essays
broadly interpreting fiduciary duties was published as the Cambridge
Handbook of Institutional Investment and Fiduciary Duty, dismissing
the belief that fiduciary duties are essentially an obligation to maximize
short-term returns, and instead focusing on long-term societal value.241
Yet, it is important to remember that many institutional investors
are not bound by any fiduciary duty to the general public in their
investment decisions.242 Banks and insurance companies invest for their
own accounts, and although they are contractually tied to the consumer
public, they are not investing on its behalf. Hedge funds are fiduciaries
of the 1% rather than 99%. Fiduciary duties do not cover investments
where the general public is not the principal. The remodeling of
fiduciary duties should be extended to bind institutional investments
even when the general public is under other stakeholder constituencies.

237. ASSET MGMT. WORKING GRP. UNEP FINANCE INITIATIVE, FIDUCIARY
RESPONSIBILITY 11 (2009), http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/fiduciaryII.pdf
[http://perma.cc/SD5C-BELD].
238. See id. at 44.
239. See id.
240. See INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES INC., 2014 SRI U.S. PROXY
VOTING GUIDELINES (2014), http://www.issgovernance.com/file/2014_Policies/2014IS
SSRIUSAGuidelines.pdf [http://perma.cc/4EVX-ULQK].
241. THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT AND FIDUCIARY
DUTY 1-2 (James P. Hawley et al. eds., 2014).
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C. PLATFORM AND AUDIENCE FOR SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING
The target audience for sustainability reporting is the general
public. Sustainability reporting aims to bring to the public condensed
and systemic information regarding the non-financial performance of
corporations. Yet, sustainability data is still limited to the financial
reporting available on EDGAR, where institutional investors are
generally the only parties accessing and reading such disclosures. Even
when sustainability reporting becomes mandatory, it typically applies
only to listed corporations.243 Despite being a disclosure platform based
on stakeholder theory, sustainability reporting is typically adopted only
in public corporations. Corporations may have a major role in society
and provide essential services and products to the public, but when
funded privately, are exempt from any accountability to public
transparency regarding their performance.
Because the target audience for sustainability reporting is wider
than the investor constituency, sustainability reporting should be voiced
through additional platforms to reach the general public. Mandatory
regulations imposing sustainability reporting obligations should apply to
corporations holding public roles or providing public services, even
when funded privately.
CONCLUSION
Stakeholder theory and team production analysis theorize corporate
law as team production law, providing an organizational platform for
various stakeholder constituencies.244 Yet, in the scholarship of
stakeholder theory, no attention is devoted to the nature of the
corporation’s relationships with the various stakeholder constituencies.
Unlike financiers, employees, and suppliers, the 99% contract with the
corporation at arm’s length, as its end consumers, or do not contract
with it at all, simply coexisting alongside the corporation.
Under this organizational model, the general public may participate
in the corporate enterprise only by providing public financing. However,
this Article outlined the impact of institutionalization on the interaction
between the general public and the public corporation because the

243.
244.

See supra Part III.C.
Blair & Stout, supra note 5, at 249-50.

210

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXI

general public no longer holds listed equity directly. Not all institutional
investors are investing on behalf of the public, and shareholder
empowerment platforms are frequently mobilized by intermediaries
representing only the wealthiest 1%. The objectives and methods used
by institutional investors are potentially divergent from those of the
general public, and potentially impose negative externalities on retail
investors. The prominence of institutional investors, and the differences
between institutional investors and retail investors, increase the
likelihood of potential conflicts of interest between the shareholders and
other stakeholder constituencies of the corporation.
This Article described increasing trends towards the convergence of
public corporations with the general public. Impact investments, social
responsible investments, CSR, sustainability reporting, and customer
voice all represent commitments to enhancing corporate accountability
towards the 99%.
This Article analyzed these trends and raised policy implications.
Corporate law must face the challenge of aligning shareholders’
interests with those of the general public. In a world of institutional
investments, enhancing shareholder value is not always a good heuristic
for aggregate social welfare. In addition, as the general public is no
longer serving in the shareholding constituency while the target
audience of sustainability reporting is the general public, sustainability
reporting should not be restricted to public corporations; rather,
sustainability reporting should apply to corporations serving significant
public roles even when funded privately.
The contribution of this Article is in raising the timely concern for
the agency costs embedded in the relationship between the general
public and institutional investors. When shareholders’ interests are not
necessarily aligned with those of the general public’s, we have reason to
revisit the axiom of shareholder value as the underlying purpose of
corporations, and accordingly reconsider the design of corporate law.

